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GHETTOS EVERYWHERE? RETHINKING URBAN POVERTY AND SEGREGATION IN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

MARGINALITY: new regime of urban poverty has arisen in advanced society

ETHNICITY: marginality has been confounded and confused with ethnicity and territory

CONVERGENCE: new nexus of marginality and ethnicity/territory mark epochal convergence: rise and spread of "ghettos" in Western Europe?

POLICY: leads to new policy directions (rise of new government of social insecurity)

Brings together URBAN OUTCASTS, PUNISHING THE POOR, DEADLY SYMBIOSIS

Symptoms of new forms of poverty

- "underclass" in the US

- "exclusion" in Europe, emergence of "ghettos"?

- is there convergence between Europe and US

1- URBAN MARGINALITY: A DIAGNOSTIC (world of work is primary: desocialized wage labor, the unmaking of the working class)

FOUR LOGICS (broader context, identifying parameters of phenom)

1. Macrosocial dynamic - the resurgence of social inequality
2. Economic dynamic - the mutation of wage labor
3. Political dynamic - the reconstruction of welfare states
4. Spatial dynamic - concentration and stigmatization

-CHARACTERIZE ADVANCED MARGINALITY

The resurgence of extreme poverty and destitution, ethnoracial divisions (linked to their colonial past) and public violence, and their accumulation in the same distressed urban areas suggest that the metropolis is the site and fount of novel forms of exclusionary social closure in advanced societies. This paper essays an ideal-typical characterization of this new, ascending regime of urban marginality by contrasting it with selected features of urban poverty in the postwar era of Fordist growth. Six distinctive features of advanced marginality are proposed:

- 1-the growing internal heterogeneity and desocialization of labor;
- 2-the functional disconnection of neighborhood conditions from macro-economic trends;
- 3-territorial fixation and stigmatization;
- 4-spatial alienation and the dissolution of place;
- 5-the loss of a viable hinterland;
- 5-and the symbolic fragmentation of marginalized populations.

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2- ETHNICITY/TERRITORY/GHETTO (diversion, screen, confusion)

DECONSTRUCT UNDERCLASS

3 faces of the underclass

4 problems with notion

beyond "terministic screen" (Kenneth Burke)

TERRITORY AS POLITICAL SCREEN

"Concepts," warns Wittgenstein, "may alleviate mischief or they may make it worse; foster it or check it."

"Men seek vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality," writes Kenneth Burke (1973: 4) in his Philosophy of Literary Forms. "To this end they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality." In the case of the "urban underclass," circumstances were such that deflection prevailed by a landslide.

CONSTRUCT GHETTO

no sociological concept, confusion, woolly, undefined

genealogy: brief history of term (4 phases in US)

2 faces of ghetto: extraction/ostracization

four elements: stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, instill encasement

genus: institutions of forced confinement (*table prison/ghetto*)poverty, segregation, ethnic clustering (*table ghetto/cluster*)

tainted identity machine

BREAK DOWN FALSE CATEGORY OF RACISM, replace it by constituent forms, specify what we mean by ghetto and separate ghettoization from poverty, discrimination, segregation, involution.

INTRODUCTION: triangle state (penalty)/ market (class)/ ethnicity (race) as projected onto the city: OS CONDENADOS, PUNIR OS POBRES, SIMBIOSIS LETAL.

In OS CONDENADOS, I sketched a compact characterization of what I take to be a new regime of urban marginality. This regime has been ascendant for the past three decades or so, since the close of the Fordist era defined by standardized industrial production, mass consumption, and a Keynesian social contract binding them together under the tutelage of the social welfare state. Yet its full impact lies ahead of us because its advent is tied to the most advanced sectors of our economies — this is why I refer to it as "advanced marginality." It is not a residue from the past, as theories of de-industrialization and skills or spatial mismatch would have it, but a harbinger of the future. Identifying the distinctive properties of this consolidating regime of urban marginality linked to the ascendant mode of capitalist growth helps us pinpoint what exactly is new about the "new poverty" of which the city is the site and fount and why old remedies of more economic growth and an extended wage labor sphere are largely without effect.

Second, I turn to the question that implicit informs or explicit guides European debates on the resurgence of destitution, division, and tension in the transforming metropolis: namely, are we witnessing an epochal convergence of urban poverty regimes across the Atlantic? I argue that, contrary to superficial journalistic portraits and hasty scholarly pronouncements, we are not: although it is fueled by common structural forces, urban relegation follows different social and spatial dynamics on the two continents that correspond to the distinct state structures, paths of civic incorporation, and urban legacies of the Old and New Worlds.

Lumping these variegated dynamics under the catch-all phrase of “Americanization” (or one of its partial derivatives, such as racialization, ghettoization, or multiculturalism, as many analysts of the urban scene have been wont to do) is neither empirically illuminating, nor analytically fruitful. The combined resurgence of inequality and rising hegemony of U.S.-rooted concepts across the globe should not blind us to persistent divergences in the ways societies produce, organize, and react to urban polarization, even as its structural sources are similar across societies. At the same time, European state elites must beware of pursuing public policies inspired by neoliberalism that reinforce blind market sanctions in the allocation of space, jobs, and people, and tend to isolate distinct urban zones and populations, thereby encouraging them to pursue divergent and even oppositional life strategies that can set off self-reinforcing cycles of social involution not unlike those that underlay segmentation and ghettoization in the United States.

It is a paradox that, while the social sciences have made extensive use of the “ghetto” as a descriptive term, they have failed to forge a robust analytical concept of the same. In the historiography of the Jewish diaspora in early modern Europe and under Nazism, the sociology of the black American experience in the twentieth-century metropolis, and the anthropology of ethnic outcasts in Africa and East Asia, its three traditional domains of application, the term “ghetto” variously denotes a bounded urban ward, a web of group-specific institutions, and a cultural and cognitive constellation (values, mind-set, or mentality) entailing the sociomoral isolation of a stigmatized category as well as the systematic truncation of the life space and life chances of its members. But none of these strands of research has taken the trouble to specify what makes a ghetto qua social form, which of its features are constitutive and which derivative, as they have, at each epoch, taken for granted and adopted the folk concept extant in the society under examination—which explains that the notion, appearing self-evident, does not figure in most dictionaries of social science, including previous publications of this encyclopedia.

A WOOLY AND SHIFTING NOTION

Thus the semantic range of the “ghetto” in American society and social science, which has dominated inquiry into the topic both quantitatively and thematically, has successively expanded and contracted in keeping with how political and intellectual elites have viewed the vexed nexus of ethnicity and poverty in the city (Ward 1989).

1-RESTRICTED At first, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the term designated residential concentrations of European Jews in the Atlantic seaports and was clearly distinguished from the “slum” as an area of housing blight and social pathology.

A European import of medieval origins, the word ghetto was initially applied strictly to residential concentrations of Eastern European Jews who settled in seaports along the Atlantic at the close of the nineteenth century. During this period, neighborhoods of physical and social degradation thought to thwart efforts at individual uplift and group improvement were labelled slums (Bender 1975). In these tristely notorious territories, moral isolation and environmental disability were said to combine with genetic inferiority to produce depravity, destitution, popular disruption, and pauperism. The “discovery” of the slum in the period 1840-1875 was the major impetus behind the growth of philanthropy, moral reform, and urban inquiry, as manifested by the creation of the American Social Science Association in 1865 and by the onset of the settlement house movement a few decades later.

2-EXPANSIVE

It dilated during the Progressive era to encompass all inner-city districts wherein exotic newcomers gathered, namely lower-class immigrants from the Southeastern regions of

Europe and African Americans fleeing the Jim Crow regime of caste subjugation in the U.S. South. Expressing ruling-class worries over whether these groups could or should assimilate into the predominant Anglo-Saxon pattern of the country, the term referred then to the intersection between the ethnic neighborhood and the slum, where segregation combined with physical disrepair and overcrowding to exacerbate urban ills such as criminality, family breakdown, and pauperism, and thwart participation in national life. This conception was given scientific authority by the ecological paradigm of the Chicago school of sociology. In his classic book *The Ghetto*, Louis Wirth (1928: 6) assimilates to the Jewish ghetto of medieval Europe the "Little Sicilies, Little Polands, Chinatowns, and Black Belts in our large cities," along with the "vice areas" hosting deviant types such as hobos, bohemians, and prostitutes—all of which are said to be "natural areas" born of the universal desire of different groups to "preserve their peculiar cultural forms" and each fulfilling a specialized "function" in the broader urban organism.

During the progressive era, the referent of "ghetto" expanded "to describe the segregation of exotic minorities in the crowded sections of the inner city" (Ward 1989: 95). This new usage expressed widespread skepticism as to whether the new immigrant streams--of Southern and East-Central European provenance as well as of lower class composition--could be or should be assimilated within the predominant Anglo-Saxon pattern of the nationalizing United States. It also signaled intensifying hostility towards African-Americans whose numbers were growing as they fled the oppressive regime of the Southern states to rally the "promised land" of the Northern city after the outbreak of World War I (Grossman 1989). In this second phase, the ghetto was thus redefined as the intersection between the ethnic neighborhood and the slum, where segregation combined with housing dilapidation to exacerbate urban ills and exclude residents from full participation in societal life (Lubove 1962).

The terms (German, Swedish, Russian, Greek, etc.) "colony" and (black) "belt" were also employed to differentiate European immigrant quarters and African-American enclaves in the city.² "Colony" referred to the propensity of some migrant groups, particularly the Irish, Sicilians, and Polish, to settle together by originating kinship cluster, village, or region. "Belt", by contrast, signaled the compressed and contiguous character of the bounded districts reluctantly conceded to African-Americans--the term "Black Belt" originally designated those regions of the South where the plantation economy was dominant owing to their dark and fertile soil fit for the cultivation of cotton.

Yet "ghetto" came increasingly to subsume lower-class white, black, as well as Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods where deprivation overlapped with ethnonational, racial, or religious segmentation. This reflected the (mistaken) view of the newly professionalized urban experts that African-Americans were but the latest immigrant stream to come into the city's ambit and that, as their predecessors, they would eventually assimilate into American society. Thus the founders of the Chicago school of sociology "believed and taught their students to believe that all ethnic neighborhoods were--or once had been--ghettos, like the Black Belt. They viewed Negroes as just another ethnic group, whose segregation was largely voluntary and would prove to be only temporary" (Philpott 1978: 136).³

3-RESTRICTIVE

The notion contracted after World War II under the press of the Civil Rights movement to signify mainly the compact and congested enclaves to which African Americans were forcibly

² Cf. the designation employed by Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (in Park and Burgess 1923) in their famous concentric map of the "natural areas" of the city. The term "Little Africa" was also used in some cities to refer to segregated black settlements (Wade 1990).

³ In *The Ghetto*, Wirth (1928: 6) assimilates to the ghetto the "Little Sicilies, Little Polands, Chinatowns, and Black belts in our large cities," along with "vice areas"--all of which are said to be "natural areas" fulfilling a "function" in the broader urban organism.

relegated as they migrated into the industrial centers of the North. The growth of a "Black Metropolis in the womb of the white" wherein Negroes evolved distinct and parallel institutions to compensate for and shield themselves from unflinching exclusion by whites (Drake and Cayton 1945) contrasted sharply with the smooth residential dispersal of European Americans of foreign stock. Writing at the acme of the black uprisings of the sixties, Kenneth Clark (1965: 11) made this relationship of ethnoracial subordination epicentral to his dissection of the Dark Ghetto and its woes: "America has contributed to the concept of the ghetto the restriction of persons to a special area and the limiting of their freedom of choice on the basis of skin color. The dark ghetto's invisible walls have been erected by the white society, by those who have power." This diagnosis was confirmed by the Kerner Commission (1968: 2), a bipartisan taskforce appointed by President Johnson whose official report on the "civil disorders" that rocked the American metropolis famously warned that, due to white racial intransigence, America was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."

Only after World War II did the semantic range of the "ghetto" contract again to refer nearly exclusively the forcible relegation of African-Americans to compact and oft dilapidating central-city districts (Weaver 1948, Hannerz 1969: 11). The institutional and cognitive disruptions wrought by the war, the escalating influx of southern blacks into northern cities and the resulting tensions over housing and access to the other prerogatives of citizenship, the glaring contrast between the smooth residential dispersal of "ethnic whites" and the persistent spatial seclusion of African-Americans, the growing contestation of caste rule by blacks mobilizing against exclusionary violence and state policies: all helped dramatize the structural as well as experiential differences between ethnic cluster and black ghetto.

To be sure, there were still references to "white ghettos" in the sixties and after (e.g., Warner and Burke 1969, Forman 1971, Goldfield and Lane 1973, Darden 1981) and influential voices persisted in denying any institutional or cultural specificity to the location of African-Americans in the metropolitan system--most famously Glazer and Moynihan in Beyond the Melting Pot (1963) and Edward Banfield (1970) in The Unheavenly City.⁴ But the upsurge of black militancy and the historiographic revolution that accompanied it solidified identification of the term with the uniformly segregated Black Belts of the industrial city. The Chicago school thesis, reiterated by Oscar Handlin (1959) in The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto-Ricans in the Metropolis and modernized by Milton Gordon (1964) in Assimilation in American Life, that it was only a matter of time till African-American would fully benefit from the "urban elevator" and find their rightful place in a multiethnic metropolitan order, was thoroughly and repeatedly refuted by a wave of rigorous monographs on the historical formation of the ghettos of New York City, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland.⁵ The "immigrant analogy" was finally exposed for what it had been all along: a historical fallacy as well as "the greatest miscalculation" (Wade 1990: 6) of all those who had hoped that urbanization would eventually attenuate if not erase America's color line.

By the time Kenneth Clark published his acclaimed account of the Dark Ghetto, the expression was well-nigh reserved to denote--and denounce--the uniquely virulent form of territorial, economic, and sociocultural exclusion imposed by whites upon urban blacks (Clark 1965: 11):

America has contributed to the concept of the ghetto the restriction of persons to a special area and the limiting of their freedom of choice on the basis of skin color. The

⁴ See, respectively, Osofsky (1963), Spear (1967) and Philpott (1978), Katzman (1973) and Kusmer (1976). For modifications and extensions of the "ghetto synthesis" in recent historiography to other cities and regions of the United States, see Trotter (1995) and Kusmer (1995).

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The conjugation of racial schism and urban marginality as the signal feature of the black urban predicament was reiterated with vigor by the Kerner Commission in its painstaking analysis of "civil disorders" in the nation's cities: "The term 'ghetto' as used in this report refers to an area within a city characterized by poverty and acute social disorganization, and inhabited by members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of involuntary segregation" (Kerner Commission 1989: 12, my emphasis). And in an oft quoted passage, the Commission left no doubt as to the origins of the ghetto in group domination:

What white Americans have never fully understood--but what the Negro can never forget--is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condoned it. (Kerner Commission 1989: 2)

In all three of its past American incarnations, then, the notion of ghetto encompassed and tied together the ideas of ethnoracial division (and homogeneity) with those of spatial concentration and social closure.⁶ New York's Harlem, Chicago's South Side, and Detroit's Paradise Valley were never simply desolate territories of ecological disrepair and social destitution: they were--and are--manifestations of a power relation between the dominant white society and its subordinate black caste, as materialized by the twin conditions of rigid segregation and inordinate poverty thrust upon their residents.

4-GUTTING THE GHETTO: the paradoxical deracialization of a racial concept

But over the ensuing two decades the dark ghetto collapsed and devolved into a barren territory of dread and dissolution due to deindustrialization and state policies of welfare reduction and urban retrenchment. And, as racial domination grew more diffuse and diffracted through a class prism, the category was displaced by the duet formed by the geographic euphemism of "inner city" and the neologism of "underclass," defined as the substratum of ghetto residents plagued by antisocial behaviors, acute joblessness, and social isolation (Wilson 1987). By the 1990s, the neutralization of the "ghetto" in policy-oriented research culminated in the expurgation of all mention of race and power to redefine it as any tract of extreme poverty, irrespective of population and institutional makeup, in effect dissolving the ghetto back into the slum.

The extension of the term to the study of the distinctive sociocultural patterns elaborated by homosexuals in the cities of advanced societies "in response to both stigma and gay liberation" after the Stonewall riots (Levine 1979: 31) and its recent resurgence in Western Europe in heated scientific and political debates over the links between postcolonial immigration, postindustrial economic restructuring, and urban dualization (Mingione 1996) would seem only to further muddle its meaning. Yet one can extract out of these varied literatures common threads and recurrent properties to construct a relational concept of the ghetto as instrument of closure and control that clears up most of the confusion surrounding it and makes it a powerful tool for the social analysis of ethnoracial domination and urban inequality. For this it suffices to return to the historical inception of the word and of the phenomenon it depicted in Renaissance Venice.

CONSTRUCTING A CONCEPT: A JANUS-FACED INSTITUTION OF ETHNIC CLOSURE AND CONTROL

⁶ Recall that, when the term "ghetto" gained currency to refer first to Jewish and later to other immigrant neighborhoods, newcomers to America of non-English origins were commonly racialized: Jews, Germans, Italians, Poles, and Irish were perceived as distinct cultural-cum-biological groupings, each with its own mores and hereditary characteristics.

Coined by derivation from the Italian giudecca, borghetto or gietto (or from the German gitter or the Talmudic Hebrew get: the etymology is disputed), the word “ghetto” initially refers to the forced consignment of Jews to special districts by the city’s political and religious authorities. In medieval Europe, Jews were commonly allotted quarters wherein they resided, administered their own affairs, and followed their customs. Such quarters were granted or sold as a privilege to attract them into the towns and principalities for which they fulfilled key roles as money-lenders, tax collectors, and long-distance tradesmen. But, between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century, in the wake of the upheavals caused by the Crusades, favor gradually turned into compulsion (Stow 1982). In 1516 the Senate of Venice ordered all Jews rounded up into the ghetto nuovo, an abandoned foundry on an isolated island enclosed by two high walls whose outer windows and doors were sealed while watchmen stood guard on its two bridges and patrolled the adjacent canals by boat. Jews were henceforth allowed out to pursue their occupations by day but they had to wear a distinctive garb and return inside the gates before sunset on pain of serious punishment. These measures were designed as an alternative to expulsion to enable the city-state to reap the economic benefits brought by the presence of Jews (including rents, special taxes, and forced levies) while protecting their Christian residents from contaminating contact with bodies perceived as unclean and dangerously sensual, carriers of syphilis and vectors of heresy, in addition to bearing the taint of money-making through usury which the Catholic Church equated with prostitution (Sennett 1994: 224).

As this Venetian model spread in cities throughout Europe and around the Mediterranean rim (Johnson 1997: 235-245), territorial fixation and seclusion led, on the one hand, to overcrowding, housing deterioration, and impoverishment as well as excess morbidity and mortality, and, on the other, to institutional flowering and cultural consolidation as urban Jews responded to multiplying civic and occupational restrictions by knitting a dense web of group-specific organizations that served as so many instruments of collective succor and solidarity, from markets and business associations, to charity and mutual aid societies, to places of religious worship and scholarship. The Judenstadt of Prague, Europe’s largest ghetto in the eighteenth century, even had its own city hall, the Rathaus, emblem of the relative autonomy and communal strength of its residents, and its synagogues were entrusted not only with the spiritual stewardship but also with the administrative and judicial oversight of its population. Social life in the Jewish ghetto was turned inward and verged “on overorganization” (Wirth 1928: 62), so that it reinforced both integration within and isolation from without.

One can detect in this inaugural moment the four constituent elements of the ghetto, viz., stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement. The ghetto is a social-organizational device that employs space to reconcile two antinomic purposes: **to maximize the material profits extracted** out of a group deemed defiled and defiling; and **to minimize intimate contact with its members** so as to avert the threat of symbolic corrosion and contagion they carry. This same dual rationale of economic exploitation cum social ostracization governed the genesis, structure, and functioning of the African-American ghetto in the Fordist metropolis during most of the twentieth century. Blacks were recruited into Northern U.S. cities after World War I because their unskilled labor was indispensable to the industries that formed the backbone of the expanding factory economy. But there was no question of them mixing and consorting with whites, who regarded them as inherently vile, congenitally inferior, and shorn of ethnic honor owing to the stain of slavery. As blacks moved in from the South in the millions, white hostility increased and patterns of discrimination and segregation that had hitherto been informal and inconsistent hardened in housing, schooling, and public accommodations and were extended to the economy and polity (Spear 1968, Osofsky 1971). African Americans had no choice but to seek refuge inside the bounded perimeter of the Black Belt and to endeavor to develop in it a network of separate institutions to procure the basic needs of the castaway community. Thus arose a paral-

lel city anchored by black churches and newspapers, black block clubs and lodges, black schools and businesses, and black political and civic associations, nested at the core of the white metropolis yet sealed from it by a impassable fence built of custom, legal suasion, economic discrimination (by realtors, banks, and the state), and by violence manifested in the beatings, fire-bombings, and riots that checked those who dared stray across the color line.

This forced institutional parallelism predicated on enveloping and inflexible spatial seclusion—not extreme poverty, housing blight, cultural difference, or mere residential separation—is what has distinguished African Americans from every other group in U.S. history, as noted by leading students of the black urban experience from W.E.B. Du Bois and E. Franklin Frazier to Drake and Cayton to Kenneth Clark and Oliver Cox (Wacquant 1998). It also characterizes the trajectory of the Burakumin in the Japanese city after the close of the Tokugawa era (Hane 1982). As the descendants of the eta, the lowest of the four castes forming the estate order of feudal Japan, the Burakumin were untouchables in the eyes of the Buddhist and Shinto religions, and they were legally confined from sundown to sunup in out-of-the-way hamlets (buraku), obliged to wear a yellow collar and to walk barefoot, expected to drop on their hands and knees when addressing commoners, and restricted to marrying solely among themselves. Though they were officially emancipated in 1871, as they moved into cities they were funneled against their will into notorious neighborhoods near garbage dumps, crematoria, jails, and slaughterhouses, widely viewed as nests of criminality and immorality. There, they were barred from industrial employment and locked in low-paying and dirty jobs, sent to separate schools, and compelled to remain endogamous by the indelible taint of their blood as traced through “family registration records” (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1966). In the late 1970s, according to the Burakumin Defense League, they were estimated to number 3 million, trapped in 6,000 ghettos in some thousand cities across the main island.

Spread over three continents and five centuries, the Jewish, African-American, and Burakumin cases demonstrate that the ghetto is not, pace Wirth (1928: 284-285), a “natural area” arising via environmental adaptation governed by a biotic logic “akin to the competitive cooperation that underlies the plant community.” The error of the early Chicago school here consisted in falsely “converting history into natural history” and passing ghettoization as “a manifestation of human nature” virtually coterminous with “the history of migration” (Wirth 1928: 285) when it is a highly peculiar form of urbanization warped by asymmetric relations of power between ethnoracial groupings: a special form of collective violence concretized in urban space. That ghettoization is not an “uncontrolled and undesigned” process, as Robert E. Park asserted in his preface to The Ghetto (Wirth 1928: viii), was especially visible after World War II when the black American ghetto was reconstructed from the top down through state policies of public housing, urban renewal, and suburban economic development intended to bolster the rigid separation of blacks from whites (Hirsch 1983). It is even more glaring in the instance of the “caste cities” built by colonial powers to inscribe in space the hierarchical ethnic organization of their overseas possessions, such as Rabat under French rule over Morocco and Cape Town after the passage of the Group Areas Acts under the apartheid regime of South Africa (Abu-Lughod 1980, Western 1982).

Recognizing that it is a product and instrument of group power makes it possible to appreciate that, in its full-fledged form, the ghetto is a Janus-faced institution as it serves opposite functions for the two collectives it binds in a relation of asymmetric dependency. 1-For the dominant category, its rationale is to confine and control, which translates into what Max Weber calls the “exclusionary closure” of the dominated category.

2-For the latter, however, it is an integrative and protective device insofar as it relieves its members from constant contact with the dominant and fosters consociation and community building within the constricted sphere of intercourse it creates. Enforced isolation from the outside leads to the intensification of social exchange and cultural sharing inside. Ghettos are the product of a mobile and tensionful dialectic of external hostility and internal affinity that expresses itself as ambivalence at the level of collective consciousness.

Thus, although European Jews consistently protested relegation within their outcast districts, they were also deeply attached to them and appreciative of the relative security they afforded and the special forms of collective life they supported: Frankfurt's ghetto in the eighteenth century was "not just the scene of confinement and persecution but a place where Jews were entirely, supremely, at home" (Gay 1992: 67). Similarly black Americans took pride in having "erected a community in their own image," even as they resented the fact that they had done so under duress, as a result of unyielding white exclusion aimed at warding off the specter of "social equality," that is, sexual mixing (Drake and Cayton 1945: 115).

DISSENTANGLING POVERTY, SEGREGATION, AND ETHNIC CLUSTERING

Articulating the concept of ghetto makes it possible to disentangle the relationship between ghettoization, urban poverty, and segregation, and thence to clarify the structural and functional differences between ghettos and ethnic neighborhoods. It also enables us to spotlight the role of the ghetto as symbolic incubator and matrix for the production of a spoiled identity.

1-GHETTO/POVERTY

Poverty is a frequent but derivative and variable characteristic of ghettos: the fact that most ghettos have historically been places of endemic and often acute misery owing to the paucity of space, the density of settlement, and the economic exploitation and generalized maltreatment of their residents does not imply that a ghetto is necessarily a place of destitution, nor that it is uniformly deprived.

The Judengasse of Frankfurt, instituted in 1490 and abolished in 1811, went through periods of prosperity no less than penury and it contained patches of extraordinary opulence as court Jews helped the city become a vibrant center of trade and finance—part of its glamor to this day comes from it being the ancestral home of the Rothschild dynasty (Wirth 1928: chapter 4). James Weldon Johnson (1937: 4) insisted that the Harlem of the thirties was "not a slum or a fringe" but the "cultural capital" of black America, where "the Negro's advantages and opportunities are greater than in any other place in the country." Likewise, Chicago's "Bronzeville" was far more prosperous at mid-century than Southern black communities and harbored the largest and most affluent African-American bourgeoisie of its era (Drake and Cayton 1945). Whether a ghetto is poor or not depends on extraneous factors such as demography, ecology, state policies, and the shape of the surrounding economy.

Conversely, not all dispossessed and dilapidated urban districts are ghettos. Declining white neighborhoods in the deindustrializing cities of the U.S. Midwest and British Midlands, depressed rural towns of the former East Germany and Southern Italy, and the disreputable villa miserias of the greater Buenos Aires at the close of the twentieth century are territories of working-class demotion and decomposition, not ethnic containers dedicated to maintaining an outcast group in a relationship of seclusive subordination. They are not ghettos other than in a metaphorical sense, no matter how impoverished—if extreme rates of poverty sufficed to make a ghetto, then large chunks of the former Soviet Union and most third-world cities would be gargantuan ghettos. The favelas of the Brazilian metropolis often portrayed as segregated dens of dereliction and disorganization turn out to be working-class wards with finely stratified webs of ties to industry and to the wealthy districts for which they supply household service labor. As in the ranchos of Venezuela and the poblaciones of

Chile, the families that dwell in these squatter settlements span the color continuum and have extensive genealogical bonds to higher-income households; they are “not socially and culturally marginal, but stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system” (Perlman 1976: 195; also Quijano 1968). Given that **not all ghettos are poor and not all poor areas are ghettos, one cannot collapse and confound** the analysis of ghettoization with the study of slums and lower-class districts in the city.

2.-GHETTO/SEGREGATION

Similarly, all ghettos are segregated but not all segregated areas are ghettos. The select boroughs of the West of Paris, the exclusive upper-class suburbs of Boston or Berlin, and the “gated communities” that have mushroomed in global cities such as São Paulo, Toronto, and Miami are monotonous in terms of wealth, income, occupation, and often ethnicity, but they are not for all that ghettos. Segregation in them is entirely voluntary and elective, and for that reason it is neither all-inclusive nor perpetual. Fortified enclaves of luxury package “security, seclusion, social homogeneity, amenities, and services” to enable bourgeois families to escape what they perceive as “the chaos, dirt, and danger of the city” (Caldeira 2000: 264-265). These islands of privilege serve to enhance, not curtail, the life chances and protect the lifestyles of their residents, and they radiate a positive aura of distinction, not a sense of infamy and dread.

This suggests that **residential segregation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ghettoization**. For a ghetto to emerge spatial confinement must, first, be imposed and all-encompassing and, second, it must be overlaid with a distinct and duplicative set of institutions enabling the group thus cloistered to reproduce itself within its assigned perimeter. If blacks are the only ethnic group to be “hypersegregated” in American society (Massey and Denton 1992), it is because they are the only community to have combined involuntary segregation with organizational parallelism entrapping them in a separate and inferior social cosmos of their own, which in turn bolstered their residential isolation.

That even involuntary segregation at the bottom of the urban order does not eo ipso produce ghettos is demonstrated by the fate of the declining French banlieues after the 1980s. Although they have been widely disparaged as “ghettos” in public discourse and their inhabitants share a vivid feeling of being cast out in a “penalized space” suffused with boredom, anguish, and despair (Pétonnet 1982), relegation in these depressed concentrations of public housing at the urban periphery is based on class, not ethnicity; as a result they are culturally heterogeneous, typically harboring native French families along with immigrants from two dozen nationalities; and their inhabitants suffer not from institutional duplication but, on the contrary, from the lack of an ingrown organizational structure capable of sustaining them in the absence of gainful employment and adequate public services. Like the British or Dutch inner cities and the immigrant clusters of urban Germany or Italy, the French banlieues are, sociologically speaking, anti-ghettos (Wacquant 2004).

3.-GHETTO VERSUS ETHNIC CLUSTER

Ghettos and ethnic neighborhoods have divergent structures and opposite functions: moving beyond a gradational perspective to scrutinize the peculiar patterning of social relations within the ghetto as well as between it and the surrounding city throws into sharp relief the differences between the ghetto and the ethnic clusters or immigrant neighborhoods such as newcomers to the metropolis have formed in countless countries. The foreign “colonies” of interwar Chicago that Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth—and after them the liberal tradition of assimilationist sociology and historiography—mistook for so many white “ghettos” were scattered and mobile constellations born of cultural affinity and occupational concentration. Segregation in them was partial and porous, a product of immigrant solidarity and ethnic attraction instead of being imposed by outgroup hostility. Consequently residential separation was neither uniformly nor rigidly visited upon these groups: in 1930, when the all-black Bronzeville harbored 92% of the city’s Afro-American population, Chi-

Chicago's Little Ireland was "an ethnic hodge-podge" of 25 nationalities composed of only one-third Irish persons and containing a paltry 3 % of the city's denizens of Irish ancestry (Phillip 1978: 141-145).

What is more, the distinctive institutions of European immigrant enclaves were turned outward: they operated to facilitate adjustment to the novel environment of the U.S. metropolis. They neither replicated the organizations of the country of origin nor perpetuated social isolation and cultural distinctiveness, and so they typically waned within two generations as their users gained access to their American counterparts and climbed up the class order and the corresponding ladder of places (Nelli 1970; a similar process of spatial diffusion via class incorporation of Belgian, Italian, Polish and Iberian immigrants in the French industrial city is reported by Noiriel 1989). All of which is in sharp contrast with the immutable racial exclusivity and enduring institutional alterity of the Black Belt. This Chicago illustration dramatizes the fact that immigrant neighborhood and ghetto serve diametrically opposed functions: the one is a springboard for assimilation via cultural learning and social-cum-spatial mobility, the other a material and symbolic isolation ward geared toward dissimilation. The former is best figured by a bridge, the latter by a wall.

A TAINTED IDENTITY MACHINE

The ghetto is not only the concrete means and materialization of ethnoracial domination through the spatial segmentation of the city but also a potent collective identity machine in its own right. For it helps incrustate and elaborate the very division of which it is the expression in two complementary and mutually reinforcing ways.

1-First the ghetto sharpens the boundary between the outcast category and the surrounding population by deepening the sociocultural chasm between them: it renders its residents objectively and subjectively more dissimilar from other urban dwellers by submitting them to unique conditionings, so that the patterns of cognition and conduct they fashion have every chance of being perceived by outsiders as singular, exotic, even aberrant (Sennett 1994: 244; Wilson 1987: 7-8), which feeds prejudicial beliefs about them.

2-Second the ghetto is a cultural combustion engine that melts divisions amongst the confined group and fuels its collective pride even as it entrenches the stigma that hovers over it. Spatial and institutional entrapment deflect class differences and corrode cultural distinctions within the relegated ethnoracial category. Thus Christian ostracism welded Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews under an overarching Jewish identity such that they evolved a common "social type" and "state of mind" across the ghettos of Europe (Wirth 1928: 71-88 and 1964). America's dark ghetto similarly accelerated the sociosymbolic amalgamation of mulattos and Negroes into a single "race" and turned racial consciousness into a mass phenomenon fueling community mobilization against continued caste exclusion (Drake and Cayton 1945: 390).

Yet this unified identity cannot but be stamped with ambivalence as it remains tainted by the very fact that ghettoization proclaims what Weber calls the "negative evaluation of honor" assigned to the group confined. It is therefore wont to foster among its members sentiments of self-doubt and self-hatred, dissimulation of one's origin through "passing," the pernicious derogation of one's kind, and even fantastical identification with the dominant (Clark 1965: 63-67). And, because ghettoization is typically bound up tightly with ethnicity, segregation, and poverty, it is difficult to discern empirically which of the properties exhibited by ghetto dwellers are "ghetto-specific cultural traits" as opposed to properties expressive of class, community, or masculinity (Hannerz 1968: 79). Also cultural forms forged in the ghetto seep across its boundaries and circulate through the surrounding society where they often become outward signs of cultural rebelliousness and social eccentricity—as indicated by the fascination of bourgeois teenagers around the world for black American "gangster rap." This makes it difficult to distinguish between cultural forms effectively in currency

among ghetto residents and the public imagery of them diffused in the broader society (including via scholarly writings).

It is fruitful to think of ghetto and ethnic cluster as two idealtypical configurations situated at opposite ends of a continuum along which different groups can be located or travel over time depending on the intensity with which the forces of stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional duplication and completeness coalesce with each other and impinge upon them. Ghettoization can then be turned into a multilevel variable for comparative analysis and empirical specification. It can become attenuated to the point where, through gradual erosion of its spatial, social, and mental boundaries, the ghetto devolves into an elective ethnic concentration operating as a springboard for structural integration and/or cultural assimilation into the broader social formation.

This describes well the trajectory of the Chinatowns of the United States from the early to the late 20th century (Zhou 1994) and the status of the Cuban immigrant enclave of Miami which fostered integration through biculturalism after the Mariel exodus of 1980 (Portes and Stepick 1993). It also characterizes the “Kimchee Towns” in which Koreans have converged in the metropolitan areas of Japan, which sport a blend of features making them a hybrid between ghetto and ethnic cluster (DeVos and Chung 1981): they are places of infamy that first arose through enmity and constraint, but over the years their population has become ethnically mixed and they have enabled Koreans to socialize and intermarry with Japanese neighbors as well as obtain Japanese citizenship through naturalization.

This schema also fits the so-called “gay ghetto,” which is more aptly characterized as a “quasi-ethnic community” since “most gay persons can ‘pass’ and need not be confined to interacting with their ‘own kind’” and none are forced to reside in the areas of visible concentration of gay institutions (Murray 1979: 169).

The double-sidedness of the ghetto as weapon and shield implies that, to the degree that its institutional completeness and autonomy are abridged, its protective role for the subordinate group is diminished and risks being swamped by its exclusionary modality. In cases where its residents cease to be of economic value to the dominant group, ethnoracial encapsulation can escalate to the point where the ghetto serves as an apparatus to merely warehouse the spoiled group or prepare it for the ultimate form of ostracization, i.e., physical annihilation.

>GHETTO-WAREHOUSE: The first scenario fits the evolution of the black American “hyperghetto” in the post-Civil Rights era: having lost its function of reservoir of unskilled labor power, it has become symbiotically linked to the hypertrophied carceral system of the United States by a triple relationship of structural homology, functional surrogacy, and cultural fusion (Wacquant 2003).

>GHETTO-ANTECHAMBER OF ELIMINATION: The second scenario is that implemented by Nazi Germany, which revived the Judenghetto between 1939 and 1944, first, to impoverish and concentrate Jews with a view toward relocation and later, when mass deportation turned out to be impractical, to funnel them toward extermination camps (Friedman 1980, Browning 1986).

The unchecked intensification of its exclusionary thrust suggests that the ghetto might be most profitably studied not by analogy with urban slums, lower-class neighborhoods, and immigrant enclaves but alongside the reservation, the refugee camp, and the prison, as belonging to a broader class of institutions for the forced confinement of dispossessed and dishonored groups. It is not by happenstance that the Bridewell of London (1555), the Zuchthaus of Amsterdam (1654), and the Hospital général of Paris (1656), designed to instill the discipline of wage work to able-bodied vagrants, beggars, and criminals via incarceration, were invented around the same time as the Jewish ghetto. And that today’s sprawling refugee camps in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and in the occupied territories of Palestine

look ever more like a cross between the ghettos of late medieval Europe and gigantic gulags.

THE SPECTER OF TRANSATLANTIC CONVERGENCE

One question is at the back of everyone's mind when it comes to the deterioration of social conditions and life chances in the Old World metropolis: does the rise of this new marginality signal a structural rapprochement between Europe and the United States on the model of the latter (see, for instance, Cross 1992, Musterd 1994, van Kempen and Marcuse 1998, Haüßerman, Kronauer, and Siebel, in press). Framed in such simplistic, either/or, terms, the question hardly admits of an analytically rigorous answer. For regimes of urban marginality are complex and capricious beasts; they are composed of imperfectly articulated ensembles of institutional mechanisms tying together economy, state, place, and society that do not evolve in unison and, moreover, differ significantly from country to country with national conceptions and institutions of citizenship. It is therefore necessary first to rephrase this query.

If by convergence, one means the wholesale "Americanization" of urban patterns of exclusion in the European city leading down the path of ghettoization of the kind imposed upon Afro-Americans since they urbanized at the beginning of this century (i.e., the formation of a segmented, parallel, sociospatial formation serving the dual purpose of exploitation and ostracization of a bounded ethnoracial category), then the answer is clearly negative (Wacquant 1996b). Contrary to first impressions and superficial, media-driven accounts, the changeover of the continental metropolis has not triggered a process of ghettoization: it is not spawning culturally uniform sociospatial ensembles based on the forcible relegation of stigmatized populations to enclaves where these populations evolve group- and place-specific organizations that substitute for and duplicate the institutional framework of the broader society, if at an inferior and incomplete level.

There is no Turkish ghetto in Berlin, no Arab ghetto in Marseilles, no Surinamese ghetto in Rotterdam, and no Caribbean ghetto in Liverpool. Residential or commercial clusters fueled by ethnic affinity do exist in all these cities. Discrimination and violence against immigrants (or putative immigrants) are also brute facts of life in all major urban centers of Europe (Wrench and Solomos 1993, Björge and White 1993). Combined with their typically lower class distribution and higher rates of joblessness, this explains the disproportionate representation of foreign-origin populations in urban territories of exile. But discrimination and even segregation is not ghettoization. Such immigrant concentrations as exist are not the product of the institutional encasement of the group premised on rigid spatial confinement — as evidenced by rising rates of intermarriage and spatial diffusion when education and class position improve (Tribalat 1995). Indeed, if anything characterizes the neighborhoods of relegation that have sprouted across the continent as mechanisms of working-class reproduction floundered, it is their extreme ethnic heterogeneity as well as their incapacity to supply the basic needs and encompass the daily round of their inhabitants — two properties that make them anti-ghettos.

If convergence implies that self-reinforcing cycles of ecological disrepair, social deprivation and violence, eventuating in spatial emptying and institutional abandonment, are now operative on the continent, then again the answer is negative because European areas of urban exile which forms nodes of polarization, as it were, remain, with few exceptions (such as Southern Italian cities), deeply penetrated by the state. The kind of "triage" and purposive desertion of urban areas to "economize" on public services that has befallen the American metropolis is unimaginable in the European political context with its fine-grained bureaucratic monitoring of the national territory. At the same time, there can be no question that the capacity of European states to govern territories of relegation is being severely tested and may prove unequal to the task if recent trends toward the spatial concentration of persistent joblessness continue unabated (Engbersen 1997).

Finally, if convergence is intended, more modestly, to spotlight the growing salience of ethnoracial divisions and tensions in the European metropolis, then the answer is a qualified and provisional yes, albeit with the following strong provisos. First, this does not neces-

sarily imply that a process of “racialization” of space is underway and that the societies of the Old World are witnessing the formation of “minorities” in the sense of ethnic communities mobilized and recognized as such in the public sphere. Second, ethnoracial conflict is not a novel phenomenon in the European city: it has surged forth repeatedly in the past century during periods of rapid social and economic restructuring — which means also that there is little that is distinctively “American” about it (Moore 1989, Noiriel 1989). Lastly, and contrary to the American pattern, putatively racial strife in the cities of the Old World is fueled not by the growing gap between immigrants and natives but by their greater propinquity in social and physical space. Ethnonational exclusivism is a nativist reaction to abrupt downward mobility by the autochthonous working class before it expresses a profound ideological switch to a racist (or racialist) register. Notwithstanding fadish blanket pronouncements about the “globalization of race,” the increased salience of ethnicity in European public discourse and everyday life pertains as much to a politics of class as to a politics of identity.

COPING WITH ADVANCED MARGINALITY: THE TURN TO THE PENAL STATE

In their effort to tackle emergent forms of urban relegation, nation-states face a three-pronged alternative. The first, middle-ground, option consists in patching up the existing programs of the welfare state. Clearly, this is not doing the job, or the problems posed by advanced marginality would not be so pressing today. One might even argue that such piecemeal and increasingly local responses to the disruptions caused by urban polarization help perpetuate the latter insofar as they fuel bureaucratic cacophony and inefficiency.

The second, regressive and repressive, solution is to criminalize poverty via the punitive containment of the poor in increasingly isolated and stigmatized neighborhoods, on the one hand, and in jails and prisons, on the other. This is the route taken by the United States following the ghetto riots of the sixties (Rothman 1995). It is no happenstance if the stupendous expansion of the carceral sector of the American state — the imprisoned population has quadrupled in twenty-five years and corrections departments risen to the rank of third largest employer of the country even as crime levels remained grosso modo constant over that period — has taken place just as casual (under)employment spread and public assistance waned before being “reformed” into a system of forced employment. For the atrophy of the social state and the hypertrophy of the penal state are two correlative and complementary transformations that partake of the institution of a new government of misery whose function is precisely to impose desocialized wage labor as a norm of citizenship while providing a functional substitute for the ghetto as a mechanism of racial control (Wacquant 1998).

While the United States are truly exceptional for the zeal with which they have embraced this “solution” to social polarization and for the scale on which they have implemented it, the temptation to rely on the police and carceral institutions to stem the effects of social insecurity generated by the spread of precarious work and the retrenchment of social welfare is present throughout Europe. This can be seen in the spectacular rise of incarceration rates among most member countries of the European Union over the past two decades; the massive over-representation, within the imprisoned population, of non-European immigrants and of people of color, as well as of drug dealers and addicts who are rejects from the labor market; the hardening of penal policies, more openly turned towards incapacitation, as over rehabilitation, and tacitly guided by the principle of “lesser eligibility”; and in the overpopulation of carceral establishments, which reduces imprisonment to its function of warehousing of the undesirable. Recent shifts in public discourses on urban disorder reveal a similar drift towards a penal treatment of poverty and of the dislocations which, paradoxically, arise from having truncated the capacity for social intervention of the state. One is thus founded to predict that a “downward” convergence of Europe on the social front, entailing further deregulation of the labor market and continued unraveling of the collective safety net, will ineluctably result in an “upward” convergence on the penal front and a new burst of carceral inflation throughout the continent (Wacquant 1999).

Despite the colossal social and fiscal costs of the mass confinement of poor and disruptive populations, imprisonment remains a seductive stop-gap solution to mounting urban dislocations even in the most liberal societies (Christie, 1997). But, aside from the powerful political and cultural obstacles that stand in the way of the wholesale carceralization of misery inherent in the makeup of social-democratic states in Europe, punitive containment leaves untouched the root causes of the new poverty. The third, progressive, response to urban polarization from below points to a fundamental reconstruction of the welfare state that would put its structure and policies in accord with the emerging economic and social conditions. Radical innovations, such as the institution of a citizen's wage (or unconditional income grant) that would sever subsistence from work, expand access to education through the lifecourse, and effectively guarantee universal access to essential public goods such as housing, health, and transportation, are needed to expand social rights and check the deleterious effects of the mutation of wage-labor (Van Parijs, 1996). In the end, this third option

is the only viable response to the challenge that advanced marginality poses to democratic societies as they prepare to cross the threshold of the new millenium.

STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL KINSHIP OF GHETTO AND PRISON

	GHETTO	PRISON
Stigma	ethnic slavery + caste "dishonor of the masses"	judicial penal sanction dishonor of offender
Constraint	social, legal restrictive covenants, redlining violence (firebombing, harassment)	legal, physical court decision police, corrections, parole
Spatial confinement	bounded district	secure facility
Institutional encasement code,	group-specific organizations "black city within the white" (church, race press, lodges, "hustle," "policy racket")	place-specific organizations "inmate society" (carceral roles, convict contraband economy)
Function (after mid-1970s)	ostracize and exploit (ostracize and warehouse)	ostracize and reform (ostracize and neutralize)

© Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: Race and the Rise of Neoliberal Penalty (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005)

CONASTING (BLACK) GHETTO AND WHITE "ETHNIC" NEIGHBORHOODS

	<i>ghetto</i>	<i>ethnic cluster</i>
ENCLOSURE	imposed	elective
BASIS	"race" (denegated ethnicity)	ethnicity
DETERMINANT	out-group hostility	in-group affinity
LOCATION	spatial void, fixed	occupational site, mobile
ETHNIC MAKEUP	homogeneous	heterogenous
SCOPE	total (contains whole group)	partial (contains segment)
SPAN	durable	temporary
FORM	compact, contiguous	fluid, dispersed
BOUNDARY	sharp, impassable	diffuse, porous
FUNCTION	dissimilation	assimilation

US blacks (servitude) – US migrants (hispanics) – postcolonial migrants in Europe

3-POLICY: PENALIZATION AS NEW MODE OF MANAGEMENT OF PROBLEM POPULATIONS AND TERRITORIES

Socialize, medicalize, penalize

The undivided hegemony of neoliberalism « security-think » on the two sides of the Atlantic hides the fact that contemporary societies dispose of at least three main strategies to treat the conditions and conducts that they deem undesirable, offensive, or threatening.

The first consist in **socializing them**, that is, to act at the level of the collective structures and mechanisms that produce and reproduce them — for instance, as concerns the continual increase in the number of homeless that « stain » the urban landscape, by building or subsidizing housing, or yet by guaranteeing them with a job or an income enabling them to acquire shelter on the rental market.

The second is **medicalization**: it is to consider that a person is living out on the street because she suffers from alcohol dependency, drug addiction, or mental health deficiencies, and thus to search for a medical remedy to a problem that is defined from the outset as an individual pathology.

The third strategy is that of **penalization**: under this scenario, it not a matter of either understanding a situation of individual distress nor a question of thwarting social cogs ; the urban nomad is labelled a delinquent (through a municipal ordinance outlawing panhandling, for instance) and finds himself treated as such ; he ceases pertaining to homelessness as soon as he is put behind bars. Here penalization serves as a *technique for the invisibilization of social « problems »* that the state, as the bureaucratic lever of collective will, no longer can or cares to treat at its roots, and the prison operates as a judicial garbage disposal wherein the human refuse of the market society are thrown.

Insofar as they have developed the necessary organizational and ideological capacity, advanced countries can implement these three strategies according to diverse combinations and for diverse conditions. The weighing and targetting of these manners of governing indocile populations and territories is the result of an eminently political choice, in the sense that they engage the conception that we have of life in common. It is crucial that these choices be made with full knowledge of the causes and consequences, in the middle

and long run, of the options offered. The most portentous scientific and civic mistake here consists in believing and making people believe, as the hypersecuritarist discourse that saturates the political and journalistic fields today asserts, that police and carceral management is the optimal remedy, the royal road to the restoration of sociomoral order in the city, if not the only means of ensuring public « safety », and that we have no alternative to contain the social and mental troubles induced by the fragmentation of wage work and the polarization of urban space.