



**SOCIEDADE  
CRISE E RECONFIGURAÇÕES**

# **VII CONGRESSO PORTUGUÊS DE SOCIOLOGIA**

**19 a 22 Junho 2012**

**Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Letras - Faculdade de Psicologia e Ciências da Educação**

---

ÁREA TEMÁTICA: Globalização, Política e Cidadania

---

**SOCIOPOLITICAL VALUES AND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE ACROSS FOUR CONTINENTS**

---

FREIRE, André,

Professor Auxiliar com Agregação, Senior Researcher at CIES-IUL

Department of Political Science and Public Policies

ISCTE - IUL (Lisbon University Institute)

[andre.freire@iscte.pt](mailto:andre.freire@iscte.pt)

---

KIVISTIK, Kats

Phd Candidate at the University of Tartu, Estonia,

Visiting Researcher at CIES-IUL (Centre for Sociological Studies and Research)



### Abstract

This study focus on the relationships between socio-political values and the Left-Right divide across four continents. Using data from the *Comparative National Election Project III* concerning 13 countries/elections from four continents, the paper analyses for the first time how well anchored in the socio-political value orientations that tap the most relevant political conflicts in the West since the XIX century individual is LR self-placement. Even previous studies that used world-wide surveys were not able to test the relationships between that “west European template” and the LR divide, simply because the batteries of values used in those other surveys relied on “highly personal orientations that are not necessarily relevant to politics”. In addition, variation across countries is described and explained.

The paper shows that values have an important and significant impact on the LR divide across the globe, but also that their importance is higher in Europe and the US than in other regions. More specifically, it shows that both politicization (“age of the democratic regime”, and “party system polarization”) and mass media “political intermediation” (freedom of press) have a significant role in explaining variation across countries.

Palavras-chave: Esquerda-direita; Valores sociopolíticos; Europa; América do Norte; América Latina; África

Keywords: Left-right; socio-political values; Europe; North America; Latin America; Africa

[PAP1471]



## Introduction

After the French Revolution, the idea of a left-right (LR) divide gained great importance in mass politics; this explains why Laponce (1981: 56) views it as a type of ‘political Esperanto’. This divide has ever since formed a categorization of ideologies, an instrument of classification of the political positions of the different parties, a code of communication, and, finally, an instrument to orientate voters in the interpretation of political phenomena and in the making of decisions (see also Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 205).

Various studies have documented the remaining importance of electors’ positions on the LR (or liberal-conservative) scale as a defining factor of their voting choices in several regions of the world. Additionally, studies about mass political attitudes based on opinion surveys and other sources have shown that also in «less central» parts of the world, like Latin America and East Asia, a very large majority of citizens not only recognize the LR divide, but also place «correctly» the political parties in such a scale. Finally, it has been shown that around the globe individual LR self-placement is also anchored in issue attitudes and value orientations. (For references, see: Van der Eijk et al, 2005; Gunther and Montero, 2001; Jou, 2010; Lee, 2007; Freire, 2006a; Evans and Whitefield, 1998; Barnes, 2002; Z.) Thus, world-wide there are several elements of evidence showing the relevance of the LR divide for both long consolidated and new democracies, showing the relevance of studying these topics to understand the functioning of democratic political systems.

With the present study about the relationships between socio-political values and the LR divide across four continents, we believe we can add relevant knowledge about these topics. First, due to richness of the dataset of the *Comparative National Election Project* (CNEP III): post electoral mass surveys from 14 countries and 18 elections (cases) from five continents (Europe, North and South America, Africa, and Asia). This paper includes 13 countries from these. The uniqueness of this data set relies not only on the diversity of countries included, but also in the richness of the values battery. The latter includes nine items measuring four underlying socio-political value orientations that tap all the relevant socio-political oppositions in the West since the XIX century (Gunther and Kuan, 2007: 263-267). Thus, this battery allows us to test how anchored is individual's LR self-placement on those four sets of oppositions across four of the above mentioned five continents.

Even the more global studies that used the World Values Surveys (Dalton, 2006; Noël and Thérien, 2008) were not able to test the relationships between that “west European template” of values and the LR divide, simply because the batteries used relied in “highly personal orientations that are not necessarily relevant to politics” (Gunther and Kuan, 2007: 262, 259-263). Gunther and Kuan (2007) already did some work on this topic using CNEP II. However, even this last work is limited. First, because it relied on a previous edition of CNEP (II) and thus included only six countries. Second, because no multivariate analysis of the anchoring of LR on values was done; the authors only correlated LR with values and then focused more on explaining the vote by social factors, values and party identification. Third, although the authors tried to explain variation across countries they did not do it in a systematic multi-level approach (same in Dalton, 2006; Noël and Thérien, 2008).

Thus, our objectives are the following. First, at the individual level, we explain how well anchored in socio-political values is individual LR self-placement across the countries/continents under scrutiny, both before and after controlling for social factors and partisan orientations. Second, using the two step hierarchical regression (multi-level modelling) approach, variation across countries in terms of the net anchoring of the LR divide on value orientations is explained.

In the next section, we review the theory and formulate hypotheses. In the third section we present data and methods. In the fourth and fifth sections we test our hypotheses and explanations. We finish with some tentative conclusions.

## Theory and hypotheses

Ever since Inglehart and Klingeman's seminal paper (1976), there has been a consensus that individuals' self-placement on the LR axis has had three major components: social, value and partisan. The social component refers to the connections between citizens' locations in the social structure, plus the corresponding social identities, and their LR orientations (1976: 245). The value or ideological component refers to the link between an individual's LR self-placement and his attitude towards the major value conflicts in Western democratic mass politics, be they socioeconomic, religious or 'new politics' (1976: 244; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1995-1997; Freire, 2006b, 2008). Finally, the partisan component of LR self-placement refers to the part of any individual's ideological orientations reflecting mainly partisan loyalties (1976: 244; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207; Freire, 2006b, 2008). In the present paper we are interested in the impact of values in LR self-placement, and we use both social factors and partisan orientations as control variables.

Using that framework, analyses of the anchoring of LR divide on value orientations were done in European countries (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207; Freire, 2006b, 2008; ). Similar analyses were done for Latin America, although they were mainly concentrated at the MPs level (Zechmeister, 2010; Rosas, 2010). More global studies relied on bivariate correlations (Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Dalton, 2006; Noël and Thérien, 2008), and/or used rather limited batteries of value orientations based upon the World Values Survey (Dalton, 2006; Noël and Thérien, 2008). The latter surveys relied on rather limited batteries of values because the items used measured "highly personal orientations that are not necessarily relevant to politics", and not the socio-political value orientations related to major Western political conflicts (Gunther and Kuan, 2007: 262). Moreover, none of the three latter studies (Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Dalton, 2006; Noël and Thérien, 2008) tried to explain cross country variation with a systematic multi-level approach. Considering these gaps in the existing literature, our objectives are as follows. First, we want to know how well anchored in "the west European template" of socio-political values is individual LR self-placement across the 13 countries and four Continents under scrutiny: Europe, North and South America, and Africa. Second, we want to explain variation across countries in terms of the net anchoring of the LR divide on value orientations.

By relying on the CNEP III battery of value orientations we can rely upon a set of nine items that allow us to measure the socio-political value orientations related to the most relevant political conflicts in the Western world, i.e., what Gunther and Kuan (2007: 263–266) call the "West European template of socio-political value orientations". In fact, to use basically the same battery across countries, and thus by contrasting comparable things, we rely on a smaller subset of value indicators. The battery was not asked in its full version in a large majority of the cases. Thus, we pick up the subset of the value items that were asked in the largest number of countries possible to allow two things: to have a reasonable number of countries and to uncover the four major political conflicts. So, we ended up with six items that were asked in 13 countries/cases.<sup>i</sup>

Now let us present the six items that cover the "west European template" and that were asked in all of 13 countries/cases. For the division between «Traditional Conservatism vs. Individualism and Liberalism» we used the items *Abortion* and *OrderLib*. In terms of *OrderLib* respondents were asked to place themselves in a 10 point scale that went from 1, "defending civil liberties" (the liberal position) to 10, "maintaining law and order" (the conservative stance). In terms of *Abortion*, respondents were asked to place themselves in a 10 point scale that went from 1, "abortion should almost always be legal" (the liberal position, which was adapted for the legal conditions for abortion in each country) to 10, "abortion should almost always be illegal" (the conservative stance). For the division between «(Socio-Economic) Liberalism vs. (Socio-Economic) Socialism», we used two items. First, *EqualInd*: respondents were asked to choose (always in a 10 point scale) between 1, "there should be a more equal distribution of wealth", and 10, "there should be more incentives for individual initiative". Second, *PrivPub*: respondents were asked to choose between 1, "Maintaining existing public enterprises", and 10, "Privatize public enterprises". As can be seen the socialist position is associated with lower values, and the liberal one with higher values. For the «Social Democratic values vs. (Socio-Economic) Liberalism», we use the item *ServTax*. Here respondents were asked to position

themselves in a 10 point scale that went from 1, “improve government services and social assistance” (social democratic position), to 10, “reduce taxes” (liberal stance). Finally, for the «Materialism vs. Post-Materialism values» we use the item *EcoGrow*: here respondents were asked to choose between 1, “Protect the environment, and try to make her cities and country side more beautiful” (green/post materialist position), to 10, “Encourage economic growth without environmental restrictions on business”(materialist stance). All values were coded so that higher numbers were related with more rightwing and/or materialist positions and, thus, we should always expect positive correlations with the LR divide.

We will analyse both the gross and the net impact of values (i.e., without controls, and after controlling for social factors). In the end we compare the relative strength of the three components (social, value and partisan) to structure citizens’ LR placement across the 13 countries and four continents. The hypotheses are the following:

*H1*: Those who support law and order incline more to the right; those who support defending civil liberties are more inclined to the left.

*H2*: those who support that there should be more incentives for individual initiative are more inclined to the right; those who support that there should be a more equal distribution of wealth are more inclined to the left.

*H3*: those who support privatization are more inclined to the right; those who support maintaining public ownership of public companies are more inclined to the left.

*H4*: those who support reduced taxes incline more to the right; those who support improved government services and social assistance are more inclined to the left.

*H5*: those who support “Encourage economic growth without environmental restrictions on business” incline more to the right; those who support “Protect the environment, and try to make her cities and country side more beautiful” are more inclined to the left.

Since we are mainly concerned with testing the gross and net impact of values on individual LR self-placement, we make no formal hypotheses for the impact of social factors and partisan orientations. Nevertheless, we expect people with higher status (education, income) and higher levels of religiosity to incline more to the right; the opposite is expected to be true for people with lower status and/or more secularization. Additionally, we expect people that identify with rightwing parties to be more inclined to the right in terms of LR self-placement; the opposite is true for people that identify with leftwing parties.

We finish with our hypotheses concerning the macro level. Bearing on the theory of politicization of issues by political actors and the subsequent political intermediation of the relevant information by the mass media, etc. (Beck et al, 1992; Gunther, Montero and Phule, 2007), Gunther and Kuan (2007: 305-315) argue that there are four major processes behind cross national differences in historical origins and perpetuation of the impact of values on electoral behaviour (but we can extend them easily to political attitudes). First, the historical origins of these value-cleavage lines rely on political conflicts about the related issues among political and intellectual elite. Second, these value-cleavage lines need to be formulated in terms of political ideologies. Third, these political ideologies need to be embraced by political parties. Fourth, both the political parties and their social allies (unions, churches, other associations, etc.) need to pass the messages contained in those value-cleavage lines/ideologies through the mass media in order to structure voters’ political attitudes and behaviour, and to mobilize them to participate in politics. Following this line of argument, we argue that the clearer the policy alternatives the parties present to the electorate, the more clearly the parties’ stands on the issues are presented by the mass media (and other voting intermediaries) to the general public, and then the more easily the citizens can differentiate between left and right. Consequently, voters can more easily rely on their value orientations to choose the ideological camp best suiting their value preferences. There are several articles showing the importance of ideological differentiation at the party-system level on citizens’ attitudes and behaviour (Van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder 2005, 2005; Freire, 2008 and 2009; Freire, Lobo, and Magalhães, 2009). However, there is no one

that tests the impact of party polarization on citizens' LR placement beyond Europe. Thus, our paper is unique in this respect. The hypotheses reads as follows:

*H6:* We expect that the greater the clarity of party alternatives (i.e., LR ideological distance between the two major parties, usually one from the left the other from the right) is the greater the level of anchoring of citizens' LR self-placement on the socio-political value orientations.

**Table 1 - Typology of countries in terms of age of the democratic regime and level of development**

<b>Level of development of societies: percentage of persons with secondary education completed or more</b>	<b>New democracies: Until 24 years since the last transition</b>	<b>Middle-aged democracies: between 26 and 41 years since the last transition</b>	<b>Long consolidated democracies: More than 41 years since the last transition</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Low level: up to 31,3%</b>				
	Hong Kong 1998 (1)	Portugal 2005	Italy 1996	<b>4 (5)</b>
	Spain 1993			
	Mozambique 2004			
<b>Middle level: between 31,7% until 49,40%</b>				<b>9</b>
	Bulgaria 1996	Greece 2004	Italy 2006	
	Chile 1994	Spain 2004		
	Greece 1996			
	Hungary 1998			
	Hungary 2006			
	South Africa 2004			
<b>High level: more than 49,40%</b>				
	Argentina 2007		USA 1992	<b>7</b>
	Chile 2000		USA 2004	
	Mexico 2006			
	Uruguay 1994			
	Uruguay 2004			
<b>Total</b>	<b>13 (14)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>20 (21)</b>

Sources: 1) Polity IV for "time elapsed since the last democratic regime transition";



2) “Percentage of persons with secondary education completed or more” – computed from the CNEP mass surveys in each country.

Notes: (1) Hong Kong is not a democracy, and it was not a democracy at the time of the survey as can clearly be found in freedom house report for that country in 2002: see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2002&country=2471> (accessed in 29/9/2011, 9h30m p.m.) Moreover, the country was considered “partly free” and was scored with 5 in terms of “political rights” (scale from 1, “the most free”, to 7, “the least free”). Thus, this case was either considered “missing” in our macro level analysis or scored with the value “0” for the number of years since the last democratic transition.

*H7*: we expect that the level of anchoring of LR self-placement on socio-political value orientations will tend to be weaker in newer democratic regimes than in long consolidated ones. New democratic regimes are less likely to exhibit high levels of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005). Political parties in new democracies often change their policy orientation, policy priorities, coalition partners—even their names—and in these conditions it is more difficult for voters (and experts) to locate the parties (Dix, 1992; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005; Freire, 2006a and 2008; Freire, Lobo and Magalhães, 2009). Moreover, in new democracies voters are still ‘learning to choose’. For a typology of the countries in the CNEP according to the age of the democratic regime (a proxy for party system institutionalization) and the level of development as measured by the aggregate levels of education, see Table 1.

Additionally, we have three control variables and hypothesis for the macro level, for which we formulate no separate hypotheses because they are considered mainly as control factors. First, we expect that in more developed countries, as measured by the percentage of persons with secondary education or more, level of anchoring of citizens’ LR self-placement on the socio-political values will be greater than in less developed countries.

Second, we expect that in more open and free societies, as measured by the Freedom House indicator for press freedom, the level of anchoring of citizens’ LR self-placement on the socio-political values will tend to be greater than in less open and less free countries. Third, only for the *Abortion* item, we expect that in more religious countries, as measured by the percentage of persons that go to church at least two times a month, the level of anchoring of citizens’ LR self-placement on issue preferences related with abortion liberalization will be greater than in less religious countries.

## **Data, methods and operationalisation**

In order to accomplish our objectives, and due to the availability of the items in the values battery, usually we have 13 cases from four continents included in CNEP III: Argentina; Chile 1994 and 1999-2000; Greece 1996; Hungary 1998 and 2006; México; Mozambique; Portugal; South Africa; Spain 1993; USA; Uruguay 1994. And we even lose one of these cases (Uruguay) if we want to take into account the full set of explanatory factors (values, social factors and partisan orientations):

To estimate the impact of macro-level items upon the country level strength of LR anchoring on value orientations we use the multi-level technique known as “two-step hierarchical regression” (Achen, 2005; Jusko and Shively, 2005). The “two-step strategy draws heavily on the statistical foundations of the hierarchical linear models but maintains many of the advantages of both partitioning and pooling strategies. And it accomplishes this without loss of efficiency as compared to pooling strategies” (Jusko and Shively, 2005: 12-13). In the first step, we estimate separate OLS regressions to explain LR self-placement in each one of the 13 cases/countries (large samples in each country: “n”). Value orientations, plus the control variables, are the independent variables at level one. The regression coefficients from the first stage are then taken as dependent variables for the second step. In this second step the independent variables are system level variables and the cases (“N”) are 13 countries/elections.

We acknowledge that a larger N would be better, but it is important to stress three things. First, while ideally N should be greater than or equal to 30, statistical simulations for N = 10 reveal “the regression coefficients and lowest-level variance components are again estimated without bias”, and only “the group-level variance was over-estimated, with a bias up to 25 per cent” (Maas and Hox, 2005: 90). Thus, “since the estimates of the regression coefficients are unbiased, even if the sample is as small as ten groups of five units it may also be useful to assess the sampling variability, provided we are interested only in the regression coefficients (Maas and Hox, 2005: 91)”. Since we have 12-13 groups (and not 10), and are mainly interested in explaining variation in the regression coefficients, we can clearly conclude the sample size at level two is adequate, even if far from ideal. Second, in cross-country comparative political analysis, larger samples for the second level are rather rare, but robust findings have been found with 26 (Jusko and Shively (2005), 16 (Lachat, 2008) and 15 groups (Walden, 2006). Third, by using the robust standard errors procedure we can reasonably be sure about the robustness of our findings in small samples.

### Value orientations and the left-right (LR) divide in the different countries

Here we analyse the anchoring of LR self-placement in socio-political values, but we consider also social factors and partisan orientations as control variables.

**Table 2 - Average left-right self-placement (1-10) and standard deviation by country**

	Mean position	Standard deviation		Mean position	Standard deviation
<b>Average equal or above the LR mean</b>			<b>Average below the LR mean</b>		
Mozambique 04	7,5	3,4	Chile 1994	5,4	2,2
Hong Kong 1998	6,1	1,5	Greece 1996	5,4	2,4
South Africa 2004	6,1	2,9	Bulgaria 1996	5,3	2,5
Greece 2004	5,9	2,3	Chile 2000	5,3	2,3
USA 1992	5,9	2,3	Hungary 2006	5,2	2,6
Mexico 2006	5,8	3,4	Hungary 1998	5,1	2,1
Uruguay 1994	5,7	2,4	Italy 2006	5,1	2,7
USA 2004	5,7	2,7	Uruguay 2004	4,9	2,8
Argentina 2007	5,6	2,3	Italy 1996	4,7	2,9
Portugal 2005	5,5	2,3	Spain 1993	4,7	2,2
<b>All countries</b>	5,5	2,6	Spain 2004	4,7	1,9

Note:

- Countries are ranked in a descending order of the average left-right self location of the their citizens.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of LR self-placement by country/year. The cases are now more numerous: 21. The average position of all countries is 5,48, which is very close to the conceptual midpoint of the scale (5,5); so the average preference is neither towards the right nor towards the left. But if we look at the countries separately, some differences are noticeable. The respondents more aligned to the right (above the mean) are from Mozambique (7,5), South Africa and Hong Kong (6,1), Greece 2004 (5,9), USA 1992 and 2004 (5,9 and 5,7), Mexico (5,8), Uruguay 1994 (5,7) and Argentina (5,6). Some of these countries have been governed at length by left-wing governments (Mozambique and South Africa) and thus come as some surprise. More aligned to left, i.e., below the mean for all the countries, are several European nations (Spain, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece 1996) but also some South American states (Uruguay 2004 and Chile). These more or less left-leaning countries make sense from what we know from their recent histories, even if some short term effects might also be present (Uruguay and Greece).

**Table 3.1 - Left-right self-placement and values, social factors and partisan identities, countries separately, OLS regression, stepwise, model 3a**

		B	SE	Beta
Hungary 06	(Constant)	5.08***	.19	
	largest right parties	2.69***	.15	.44
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	-.08**	.02	-.07
	religiosity with 4 categories	.15*	.07	.05
	largest left parties	-2.35***	.14	-.41
	Support for reduced taxes vs. increased government assistance	.05*	.02	.06
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.54		
	N of cases	971		
USA 04	(Constant)	2.96***	.42	
	education in 3 categories	-.41**	.12	-.08
	Support for economic incentives vs. equal distribution of wealth	.10***	.02	.11
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.19***	.03	.20
	largest right parties	1.38***	.18	.23
	religiosity with 4 categories	.23***	.06	.11
	Opposition to abortion vs. support for abortion	.12***	.02	.15
	largest left parties	-.83***	.16	-.15
	Support for reduced taxes vs. increased government assistance	.20***	.03	.21
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.49		

	N of cases	884		
--	------------	-----	--	--

Notes:

- \*\*\* < 0.001, \*\* < 0.01, \* < 0.05.
- Stepwise method: only variables with significant impact are considered and presented in the Table).
- Countries are presented in descending order of the strength of the overall impact of the three vectors of variables (social factors, values and party identification).

**Table 3.2 - Left-right self-placement and values, social factors and partisan identities, countries separately, OLS regression, stepwise, model 3a**

Greece 96	(Constant)	3.07***	.21	
	Support for economic incentives vs. equal distribution of wealth	.11***	.02	.15
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.06***	.02	.09
	largest right parties	2.66***	.16	.44
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	.05**	.02	.07
	religiosity with 4 categories	.23***	.06	.10
	other parties	-1.68***	.22	-.20
	Opposition to abortion vs. support for abortion	.06**	.02	.08
	largest left parties	-.68***	.14	-.13
	Support for reduced taxes vs. increased government assistance	.07***	.02	.09
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.46		
	N of cases	953		
Spain 93	(Constant)	3.54***	.26	
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.05**	.02	.07
	largest right parties	2.33***	.19	.32
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	.07***	.02	.09
	religiosity with 4 categories	.52***	.08	.19
	other parties	-.83***	.19	-.12
	Opposition to abortion vs. support for abortion	.07***	.02	-.11
	largest left parties	-1.09***	.14	-.20

	Support for reduced taxes vs. increased government assistance	.05*	.02	.06
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.35		
	N of cases	1040		
Hungary 98	(Constant)	4.93***	.13	
	largest right parties	.95***	.17	.21
	religiosity with 4 categories	.21**	.07	.10
	other parties	.66**	.23	.10
	largest left parties	-1.64***	.20	-.31
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.22		
	N of cases	873		

Notes: see Table 7.1.

**Table 3.3 - Left-right self-placement and values, social factors and partisan identities, countries separately, OLS regression, stepwise, model 3a**

Argentina 07	(Constant)	6.51***	.38	
	education in 3 categories	-.74***	.13	-0.25
	Support for economic incentives vs. equal distribution of wealth	.12***	.03	0.19
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.13***	.03	.21
	Income MD out	-2.69E-005**	.00	-.13
	Support for economic growth vs. environmental protection	.07*	.03	.09
	largest right parties	-.86*	.42	-.09
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	-.06*	.03	-.09
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.21		
	N of cases	602		
Chile 00	(Constant)	4.423***	.32	
	Support for economic incentives vs. equal distribution of wealth	.06**	.02	.08

	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.07**	.02	.10
	Income MD out	1.92E-005**	.00	.09
	largest right parties	2.43***	.30	.25
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	-.05*	.02	-.07
	other parties	-.98***	.19	-.16
	Opposition to abortion vs. support for abortion	.07***	.02	.11
	largest left parties	-.65*	.25	-.08
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.17		
	N of cases	1118		
Chile 94	(Constant)	3.23***	.33	
	Support for economic incentives vs. equal distribution of wealth	.05*	.02	.08
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.11***	.03	.16
	Support for economic growth vs. environmental protection	.08*	.03	.09
	largest right parties	2.19***	.40	.20
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	.08**	.02	.12
	religiosity with 4 categories	.33**	.10	.12
	other parties	-.62**	.23	-.10
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		
	N of cases	644		

Notes: see Table 7.1.

**Table 3.4 - Left-right self-placement and values, social factors and partisan identities, countries separately, OLS regression, stepwise, model 3a**

Mexico 06	(Constant)	5.55***	.21	
	largest right parties	2.24***	.47	.23
	other parties	-2.134***	.46	-.22
	largest left parties	1.62**	.51	.15

	R <sup>2</sup>	0.14		
	N of cases	440		
Portugal 05	(Constant)	4.56***	.17	
	largest right parties	1.52***	.25	.21
	religiosity with 4 categories	.22**	.07	.11
	Opposition to abortion vs. support for abortion	.11***	.02	.16
	largest left parties	-.51*	.21	-.09
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.12		
	N of cases	882		
South Africa 04	(Constant)	6.77***	.41	
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	-.09*	.04	-.10
	Support for economic growth vs. environmental protection	.12**	.04	.12
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	-.10**	.03	-.11
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.06		
	N of cases	787		
Mozambique 04	(Constant)	7.194***	.335	
	Support for law and order vs. civil liberties	.07*	.03	.08
	Income MD out	.00***	.00	-.16
	largest right parties	.88**	.29	.12
	Support for privatization vs. public enterprises	-.13**	.04	-.11
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.06		
	N of cases	799		

Notes: see Table 7.1.

**Table 4.1 - The impact of values and social factors on left-right self-placement, R<sup>2</sup>**

Country and year (4)	Values (1)	Social factors (2)	Values and social factors (3)
USA 04	0.42	0.12	0.43

Greece 96	0.19	0.04	0.20
Spain 93	0.14	0.12	0.20
Argentina 07	0.14	0.12	0.19
Uruguay 94	0.14	-	-
Chile 00	0.08	0.03	0.08
Chile 94	0.06	0.03	0.10
Hungary 06	0.06	0.04	0.09
South Africa 04	0.06	NS	0.06
Portugal 05	0.05	0.03	0.06
Mozambique 04	0.04	0.01	0.04
Hungary 98	0.02	0.02	0.04
Mexico 06	0.01	0.01	0.02
All countries	0.05	0.04	0.08
Bulgaria 96	-	0.04	-
USA 92	-	0.03	-
Spain 04	-	0.05	-
Uruguay 04	-	0.09	-

Notes:

- 1) “gross impact of values”: without controls.
- 2) “gross impact of social factors”: without any other vector in the equation.
- 3) The impact of values and social factors together in the same equation.
- 4) Countries / years organized by descending order of the gross impact of values.

**Table 4.2 - The impact of values, social factors and partisan identities on left-right self-placement, R<sup>2</sup>**

<b>Country and year (4)</b>	<b>Values, social and partisan identities (1)</b>	<b>Net impact of values (2)</b>	<b>Net impact of partisan identities (3)</b>
USA 04	0.49	0.31	0.06
Hungary 06	0.54	0.05	0.45



Greece 96	0.46	0.16	0.26
Spain 93	0.35	0.08	0.15
Hungary 98	0.22	0.02	0.18
Argentina 07	0.21	0.07	0.02
Chile 00	0.17	0.05	0.09
Chile 94	0.16	0.07	0.06
Mexico 06	0.14	0.01	0.12
Portugal 05	0.12	0.03	0.06
Mozambique 04	0.06	0.03	0.02
South Africa 04	0.06	0.06	0
All countries	0.20	0.04	0.12
Bulgaria 96	-	-	-
Spain 04	-	-	-
USA 92	-	-	-
Uruguay 94	-	-	-
Uruguay 04	-	-	-

Notes:

- 1) Total impact (i.e., of social factors, values and partisan identities taken together).
- 2) “Net impact of values”: “total impact” (table 8.2) minus “gross impact of values” (table 8.1).
- 3) “Net impact of partisan identities”: “total impact” (table 8.2) minus “gross impact of partisan identities” (not shown).
- 4) Countries / years organized by descending order of the “total impact”.

Let us turn now to the main focus of our study which is the relationship between values and LR self-placement for the 13 countries/years in our sample. We can see in Tables 3.1 to 3.4 that the explanatory power varies a lot across the countries. The gross impact of values on LR self-placement is only between 0.01 and 0.05 in the cases of Mexico, Hungary 1998, Mozambique, and Portugal, but it reaches as high as 0.41 (USA) and 0.19 (Greece 1996), remaining at 0.06-0.14 in the remaining cases (see Table 4.1). The explanations of variation across countries will be tested later, so let us now look more closely at the specific impact of the different types of values on individual LR self-placement.

The coefficients for the very net impact of values on LR (the liberal-conservative scale was used in the USA), after controlling for social factors and partisan identities, can be seen in Tables 3.1 to 3.4 (country by country data; merged data set not shown due to spatial limitations<sup>ii</sup>). But first let us consider the gross impact of values, i.e., without any controls (data not shown). For the merged data set, three values (orientations towards abortion, economic incentives, and law and order) are related to the LR divide more strongly than the other value items. Those who oppose abortion liberalization, support economic incentives and law and

order tend to be more rightist . The three other value items are not so strongly related with the LR divide, but still those who support tax reduction and economic growth are more rightist . There is still one unexpected result: those who support privatization tend to be more to the left, although this is the weakest association of all. But the results found for the merged data set can be due to very different impacts in the countries considered in our analyses warranting our shift to the country by country analysis.

Let us try to clarify now the paradox of the impact of attitudes toward privatization on the LR divide found in the merged data set. As expected, the relationship between privatization support and LR self-placement is rather varying across countries (Tables 3.1 to 3.4). We can find that in Chile 1999-2000, Hungary 2006, Mozambique, and South Africa the relationships are similar to those we found for the merged data set: leftwing individuals tend to support privatization. We should underline that these are all either post colonial/post apartheid (Mozambique and South Africa) and/or post authoritarian polities (all three countries), and thus support for privatization from leftwing voters might mean the desire to transfer power from the old colonial/ apartheid/authoritarian elites to the society. At the same time, in Chile and Uruguay 1994, Greece 1996, Spain 1993, and Uruguay 1994 the relationships are the opposite as we expected. So we say that this question is probably not very well suited for measuring the economic dimension across different continents because it can mean very different things for people in different societies.

The value item associated with attitudes towards abortion is significantly related to the LR self-positioning in 10 countries out of 12. The associations are not significant in Chile 1994, Mexico and South Africa. And where the relationship is significant, the effect is in the expected direction: the more liberal attitudes, the more to the left self-placement is. . Recall that we are still analysing the impact of values without any other control variables (data not shown).

The statistically significant relationship between supporting law and order measures (vis-à-vis defending civil liberties) and rightwing self location is missing only in three countries: Hungary 1998 and 2006, Mexico, and Portugal. In South Africa (RSA) the relationship conflicts with what we expected: those supporting law and order measures incline more to the left. One possible reason for this unexpected result could be because RSA has a rather unsecure social environment (crime rates are rather high there), and this insecurity hurts more those social strata that have less resources to (privately) protect themselves. Moreover, we can see that in RSA this negative (and unexpected) effect remains even when we control for social factors and partisanship (Table 3.4).

The post-materialist issue (economic growth vs. environmental protection) is statistically significant only in two countries (Argentina and South Africa); and in both cases it works in the right direction: more post-materialist attitudes are related with more leftwing self locations.

Besides privatization, the other two measures for socioeconomic issues (economic incentives vs. income equality and taxes vs. public services) are both insignificant only in Portugal, South Africa and Uruguay 1994. In three cases (Chile 1994, Greece 1996, and USA) both of the items have a significant and expected effect on LR self-placement: people more in favour of economic incentives and tax reduction incline more to the right. In some cases (Argentina, Chile 1999-2000, Hungary 1998 and 2006, Mozambique, Spain 1993) only one of the two items is significant (and always works in the expected direction). So, these two items related with “liberal vs. socialist values” (economic incentives vs. income equality) and “liberal vs. social democratic values” (taxes vs. public services) seem to be the ones more widespread to explain individual LR self-placement across the three continents.

Now let us look at the individual-level models which include not only socio-political value orientations but also the control variables measuring social factors and partisan identities (Tables 3.1 and 3.4). We see that the three components model to explain LR individual self-placement works quite well in some countries (around 0.20 of variance or greater explained: Argentina, Greece 1996, Hungary 1998 and 2006, Spain 1993, and USA) and not so well in others (between 0.20 and 0.10 of variance explained: Chile 1994 and 1999-2000, Mexico, and Portugal; below 0.10 of variance explained: Mozambique and South Africa) (see a summary of this in Table 4.2). Thus, although with some exceptions it seems that overall the model works

pretty well in Europe and North America (including Argentina), has an average performance in Latin American countries (including Portugal), and performs pretty poorly in Africa.

In this amended model, values that had already a significant impact, except support for privatization, are still statistically significant and have the expected effect. The social factors that prove to be important here are usually two: religiosity and education; and the more religious and less educated people are the more they tend to incline to the right. Income does not predict LR self-placement so well. While we have already analysed more profoundly the effect of values, and there are no specific changes worth mention in the country by country models, we will focus now on the impact of social factors in the different countries. First, looking at the country by country results we see that education and income are important in three cases: education has an influence in the USA and Argentina, and income has an influence in Argentina and in Chile 1999-2000. In all cases education has a negative effect (more educated, less rightist), but income has a positive effect (more affluent, more rightist) in Chile and a negative impact (more affluent, less rightist) in Argentina. Concerning the impact of social factors on the LR divide, religiosity is clearly the most common factor and has always the expected association: more religious people are more rightist. Religiosity has a significant effect in seven out of 12 cases (Chile 1994, Greece 1996, Hungary 1996 and 2006, Portugal, Spain 1993, and USA). By looking at the (Catholic) Southern European countries, it is also possible to claim that issues that are related to religion (in terms of both social factors and value orientations) have generally an important role in giving sense of being left or right.

The partisan identities have usually the strongest effect. Those who identify with the largest rightwing party incline quite strongly to the right, as compared to those who have no partisan preferences. Those who identify with the largest leftwing party incline quite strongly to the left, as compared to those who have no partisan preferences. In addition, those who identify themselves with smaller parties, tend to lean more to the left. The effect of partisan identities is remarkable in all countries except South Africa (here only values have a significant effect). In two cases the effect is unexpected, but perhaps still explainable. In Argentina the largest rightist party supporters lean to the left. In Mexico the largest leftist party supporters lean to the right. One plausible interpretation would be the following: non-identifiers (the reference group for these variables concerning party identification) tend to be especially more rightist in the first case, and more leftist in the second case; and this is perhaps why we find such unexpected results in the two cases.

Finally, if we compare the net effect of the three sets of factors (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) taken separately (net impact of social factors, Table 4.1; the net impact of values, and partisan identities, Table 4.2), the rankings are the following. First, in only one country, Argentina, are social factors (followed by values and partisan identities) the single most important vector of variables in explaining individual LR self-placement. Second, in only four countries (Chile 1994, Mozambique, South Africa, and USA) is the net impact of values the single most important vector of variables to explain individual LR self-placement. However, in both Chile and Mozambique the effects of values and partisan identities have almost an equal strength. Moreover, in the two African countries, overall the model performs pretty poorly, and in Chile it has only an average performance. Finally, in seven out of 12 cases (Chile 1999-2000, Greece 1996, Hungary 1998 and 2006, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain 1993) partisan identities are the single most important vector of variables to explain individual LR self-placement (followed by values, except in Hungary 1998 and Mexico). Clearly, in this respect this last group of seven cases/countries is the one that is more in line with the West European pattern (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Knutsen, 1995 and 1997; Freire, 2006b and 2008). And in 10 out of 12 cases, values are either the single most important (four cases) or the second most important (six cases) vector of variables.

**Table 5 – Explaining cross-national variation in the net impact of values on left-right self-placement (controlling social factors) – 2<sup>nd</sup> Step of the Two Step Hierarchical Regression (Beta coefficients)**

Independent variables	Dependent variables: regression coefficients for values					
	(1) abortion	(2) Economic growth	(3) Economic incentives	(4) Law & order	(5) Privatization	(6) Taxes
Democratic regime (Years)	0.0007*** (3.848)	-0.0001 (-0.433)	-0.0004 (-0.661)	0.0008* (1.982)	-0.0004 (-0.449)	0.0012*** (6.529)
Freedom of press	-0.0081 (-0.376)	-0.0620* (-1.933)	-0.0280 (-0.406)	-0.0229 (-0.422)	0.0002 (0.003)	0.0357** (2.533)
Party polarization	0.0150* (2.200)	-0.0130 (-1.420)	-0.0071 (-0.527)	-0.0034 (-0.226)	0.0136 (0.654)	0.0223*** (7.089)
Religiosity (% Pop.)	0.0010 (0.866)					
Pop. Secondary educ. or more (%)		0.0011 (0.970)	0.0029 (1.824)	0.0009 (0.589)	0.0014 (0.516)	0.0000 (0.051)
Constant	-0.0230 (-0.342)	0.0975 (0.966)	-0.0064 (-0.054)	0.0383 (0.270)	-0.0823 (-0.565)	-0.0921** (-2.794)
N	15	14	14	15	15	15
R <sup>2</sup>	0.386	0.472	0.246	0.369	0.074	0.928

Note:

- 1) In the case of Chile 1999 – ideological polarization (LR distance between the two major parties was calculated based upon voters' left-right placement of these two major parties, and not on voters' perceptions of parties' locations on the LR scale because the latter variable is missing for this country/year).
- 2) Robust standard errors procedure is used: robust statistics in parenthesis.
- 3) Non-standardized regression coefficients and probabilities associated with significance tests are shown in the table, besides  $R^2$  and N.
- 4) \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Finally, we test explanations concerning the cross-country variations in the net impact (controlling for social factors) of value orientations on LR self-placement (see Table 5). Concerning the impact of the abortion issue on the LR divide, we can clearly see that both the age of the democratic regime and the clarity of policy alternative presented by the parties to the voters have a positive and significant impact: in long consolidated democracies and in polarized party systems the impact of abortion value preferences on LR is stronger than in new democracies and/or less polarized party systems.

In terms of the impact of the other value items, only in three situations (“economic growth”, “law and order”, and “taxes vs. public services”) are there macro variables with a significant impact. In the first case, we can see that in more open and free societies, attitudes towards “economic growth vs. environmental protection” have more impact to structure LR identities. Second, the effect of value orientations towards “law and order vs. civic liberties” is stronger in long consolidated (or in middle-aged) than in new democracies. Finally, the most structured macro-level pattern is related with values concerning “taxes reduction vs. increasing public services”: in long consolidated (or middle-aged) democracies, more free societies and more polarized party systems, these value orientations have more impact to structure individual LR identities than in new democracies, less free societies, and less polarized party systems.

### **Concluding remarks**

In the present paper we tried to understand and explain the level of anchoring of the LR divide on socio-political value orientations at the mass level. The present study contributes with unique data and approaches to the understanding of the value anchoring of the right-left divide across the globe (13 countries in four Continents: Europe – West and East -, North and Latin America, Africa). The focus was on understanding and explaining variation, both across individuals and countries, in the net impact of socio-political values (related to four major political conflicts in western societies: «the west European template») on citizens’ LR self-placement.

We found that values have an important and significant impact on the LR divide across the globe, but also that their importance is higher in Europe and the US than in other regions. Furthermore, although with country exceptions, we also found that the crucial role of both partisan orientations and values to structure LR identities is more pronounced in countries culturally closer to the western centre (Europe and the US) than in new democratic regimes from more remote areas of the globe (above all in Mozambique and South Africa; but also in some Latin American countries). In a more systematic way, bearing on the two step hierarchical regression model, we found that both politicization (“age of the democratic regime” and “party system polarization”) and mass media (“political intermediation”) have a significant role in explaining variation across countries. Especially in cases of abortion and of “taxes reduction vs. strengthening social services” issue, we found that the values are more important in structuring the LR divide in long consolidated (or middle-aged) democracies, in freer societies, and/or in more polarized party systems than in new democracies.

Additionally, freedom of press and age of the democratic regime also prove to be significant in explaining cross country variation in values related to post materialism and political liberalism (, respectively: both boost the impact of these values to structure mass ideological identities.

Thus, the determination of individual LR identities is not only dependent upon individual level factors but also on macro-level factors like the geopolitical region where one lives, the age of the democratic regime, the level of politicization of political issues by the parties, and the type of political intermediation performed by the media system and other voting intermediaries.

For conclusion some clues for future research are due. We found that the “west European template” of socio-political values works better to explain LR self-placement in long consolidated (or middle-aged)

democracies, in freer societies, and in party systems with clearer policy alternatives presented to the electorate. But does this also mean that in the long term new democracies will converge with the long consolidated (or middle-aged) ones? And are there any indications of changing meanings of LR both in long consolidated (or middle-aged) and new democracies? And are there any indications of changing meanings of LR both across time and across cohorts?

Additionally, we tested only the relationships between the “west European template” of socio-political values and LR self-placement, and found that the stronger correlations were found in Europe and in the US, and that the weaker correlations were found in Africa (Latin America being usually an intermediate set of countries). However, does this mean that in those countries where LR is less anchored in the “West European template” (South Africa and Mozambique, in Africa; Argentina and Mexico, in Latin America) LR identities are neither anchored in value preferences nor in different sets of value orientations? More exploration with the CNEP data is also due in this respect.

## References

- Achen, Christopher (2005), “Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation: Beyond Regression Analysis”, *Political Analysis*, 13, 4, pp. 447-456.
- Barnes, Samuel H. (2002), “Left and Right in Old and New Democracies”, *Central European Political Science Review*, Volume 3 (7), pp. 6-15.
- Beck, Paul Allen, et al (2002), “The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices”, *The American Political Science Review*, 96 (1), pp. 57-73.
- Berglund, Frode; Holmberg, Soren; Schmitt, Hermann; and Thomassen, Jacques (2005), “Party Identification and Party Choice”, in Thomassen, Jacques (ed.), *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 106-124.
- Bobbio, N. (1994), *Direita e Esquerda*, Lisbon: Presenca.
- Colomer, J. M., and L. E. Escatel (2005), “*The Left-Right Dimension in Latin America*”, *UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 813*.
- Dalton, R. J. (2006), “Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological Polarization”. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1): 1–22.
- Dix, Robert H. (1992), “Democratization and the institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 24 (4), pp. 488-511.
- Evans, G. and S. Whitefield (1998), “The evolution of left and right in post-Soviet Russia“, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50(6): 1023-1042.
- Franklin, Mark, et al (eds.) (1992b), *Electoral Change. Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Freire, André (2006a), “Left-Right Ideological Identities in New Democracies: Greece, Portugal and Spain in the Western European Context”, *Pôle Sud – Revue de Science Politique de l’Europe Méridionale*, n° 25, II; 153-173.
- Freire, André (2006b), “Bringing Social Identities Back In: The Social Anchors of Left-Right Orientation in Western Europe”, *International Political Science Review*, 27(4), 359-378.
- Freire, André (2007), “Left-right orientations among Europeans: Increasingly Centrist and/or Irrelevant?”, Comunicação apresentada no INTUNE ( *Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an ‘ever closer Europe*) Meeting, Barcelona, 11-13 de Outubro, 2007. <http://www.intune.it/article/papers>
- Freire, André (2008), “Party polarization and citizens' left-right orientations”, *Party Politics*, 14: 189-209.

- Freire, André (2009), "Value orientations and party choice: The role of party polarization and party system institutionalization", Santiago 2009 – XXI IPSA (*International Political Science Association*) World Congress, Santiago do Chile, July 12-16, 2009.
- Freire, André; Lobo, Marina C.; and Pedro Magalhães (2009), "The clarity of policy alternatives, left-right and the European Parliament vote in 2004", *The Journal of European Integration*, Volume 31, n° 5, pp. 665-683.
- Gunther, Richard, and Kuan, Hsin-chi (2007), "Value Cleavages and Partisan Conflict", in Gunther, Richard; Montero, José Ramon; and Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 255-320.
- Gunther, Richard, and José R. Montero (2001), « The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behaviour in Four Southern European Countries », in Nikiforos Diamandouros e Richard Gunther (orgs.), *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in New Southern Europe*, Baltimore, The John Hopkin University Press pp. 83-152.
- Gunther, Richard; Montero, José Ramon; and Puhle, Hans-Jürgen (2007), "Introduction: Intermediation, Information and Electoral Politics", in Gunther, Richard; Montero, José Ramon; and Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-28.
- Huber, D. H. (1989), "Values and partisanship in left-right orientations: measuring Ideology", *European Journal of Political Research*, 17: 599-621.
- Inglehart, R. and H. D. Klingemann (1976), "Party identification, ideological preference and the left-right dimension among Western mass publics" .In: Budge, Ian ed., *Party identification and Beyond*,. London and New York: Wiley.
- Jou, Willy (2010), "The heuristic value of the left-right schema in East Asia", *International Political Science Review*, 31 (3), pp. 366-394.
- Jusko, Karen L., and Shively, W. Philips (2005), "Applying a Two-Step Strategy to the Analysis of Cross-National Public Opinion Data", *Political Analysis*, 13, 4, pp. 327-344.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (et al.) (eds.) (1999), *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (et al.) (eds.) (2010), *Latin American Party Systems*, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Knutsen, O. (1995), "Value Orientations, Political Conflicts and Left-Right Identification - A Comparative Study", *European Journal of Political Research* 28: 63-93.
- Knutsen, O. 1997. The Partisan and the Value-based Components of Left-Right Self-placement: A Comparative Study, *International Political Science Review* 18: 191-225.
- Knutsen, Oddbjorn, and Kumlin, Staffan (2005), "Value Orientations and Party Choice", in Thomassen Jacques (ed.), *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 125-166.
- Kumlin, Staffan (2001), "Ideology-driven opinion formation in Europe: The case of of Attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden", *European Journal of Political Research*, 39 (4), pp. 487-518.
- Lachat, Romain (2008), "The impact of party polarization on ideological voting", *Electoral Studies*, 27, pp. 687-698.
- Laponce, J.A. (1981), *Left and Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press..
- Lee, Aie-Rie (2007), "Value Cleavages, Issues, and Partisanship in East Asia", *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7 (2), pp. 251-274.



- Luna, Juan Pablo, and Zechmeister, E. (2010), “Political representation in Latin American”, in Kitschelt, Herbert (et al.) (eds.), *Latin American Party Systems*, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119-144.
- Maas, J.M. Cora, and Hox, Joop J. (2005), “Sufficient Sample Sizes for Multilevel Modelling”, *Methodology*, 1 (3), pp. 86-92.
- Mainwaring, Scott P. and Mariano Torcal (2005), “Party System Theory and Party System Institutionalization after the Third Wave of Democratization.” Paper presented at the Political Science Seminar of the Social Sciences Institute of the University of Lisbon, Portugal.
- Markowski, R. (1997), “Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in east Central Europe.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30/3: 221-254.
- Noël, Alain, and Thérien, Jean –Philippe (2008), *Left and Right in Global Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Rosas, Guillermo (2010), “Issues, ideologies and partisan divides”, in Kitschelt, Herbert (et al.) (eds.), *Latin American Party Systems*, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 70-95.
- Schmitt, Hermann (2009), “Partisanship in nine democracies: causes and consequences”, in Bartle, John, and Belluci, Paolo (eds.), *Political Parties and Partisanship. Social Identity and Political Attitudes*, London, Routledge, pp. 75-87.
- Whitefield, S. (2002), “Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics”, *Annual review of Political Science*, 2002, 5: 181-200.
- Van Deth, Jan W., and Elinor Scarbrough (1995), “The concept of values”, van Deth, Jan W., and Elinor Scarbrough (orgs.), *The Impact of Values*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 21-47.
- Van der Eijk, C.; Schmitt, Hermann; and Binder, Tanja (2005), “Left-right Orientations and Party Choice”, in Thomassen, Jacques (ed.), *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 167-191.
- Zechmeister, E. (2006), “What’s Left and Who’s Right? A Q-method Study of Individual and Contextual Influences on the Meaning of Ideological Labels”, *Political Behavior*. 28:151–173.
- Zechmeister, E. (2010), “Left-right semantics as a facilitator of Programmatic Structuration”, in Kitschelt, Herbert (et al.) (eds.), *Latin American Party Systems*, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 76-118.
- Welden, Steven A. (2006), “The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (2), pp. 331-349.
- Wessels, Bernhard, and Schmitt, Hermann (2008), “Meaningful choices, political supply, and institutional effectiveness”, *Electoral Studies*, 28, pp. 19-3.

---

<sup>i</sup> However, besides the nine items of the “west European template” some additional value items were included in CNEP III (18 items overall). However, due to the fact that not all items were asked in all the countries, one can reasonably argue that the value structures are not only dependent on the structure of mass attitudes in each country but also on the set of questions effectively asked there. That is why we do not use them here.

<sup>ii</sup> Even for the country by country analysis, due to spatial limitations we only show the final equations (with the three vectors of variables: social factors, values and partisan identities). But the figures presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are calculated from separate (country by country) regressions with values (gross impact of values), values and social factors, and finally values, social factors, and partisan identities. They can be furnished upon request.